Description: When regulators examine financial institutions, one of the most important areas on which they focus is capital requirements. This essay argues that we can’t push for neither too high nor too low default probabilities. Regulate too high and you introduce rigidity to the system: you choke the economy. Regulate too low and you introduce softness in your foundations: they cannot for long sustain the economy. Therefore, regulation should be set to provide a 'window for business'.

Description: Compares techniques used by the allies to win WWII e.g., transparency, collaboration, and breaking down silos to how to avert financial crises. Also compares a high-involvement ERM & business intelligence 'BI' technique to a control ERM & BI.

Description: Collection of essays received in response to the “Systemic Risk, Financial Reform and Moving Forward from the Financial Crisis” call for essays.

Description: This essay examines the root causes of the 2008 global financial crisis precipitated by the bursting of the housing bubble. The author suggests that if fraud is not addressed, future crises, perhaps even worse, will occur.

Description: Describes ways to avoid the next financial crisis by following the example of those who got it right and discerning what you could be doing to prevent your firm from experiencing excessive losses in future crises.

Description: Potential actions are recommended for key stakeholders to manage the unintended consequences of systemic risk “brewing” within the retirement system today.

Description: This essay addresses ways to reduce 'negative externality' types of systemic risk. A negative externality is defined as a transaction between two parties that results in costs which accrue, in part, to one or more third parties, e.g., to society as a whole.

Description: A comprehensive analysis of the current economic crisis and risk management that considers the social and political behavior of people.

Description: In this mortgage crisis, it appears mortgage brokers and mortgage originating bankers were similar to unchecked MGAs. These brokers and banks had an incentive to produce mortgages that would generate fees for them. Those mortgagees would then be sold to investors, generating additional fees – but it appears there were often no incentives to align the interests of those mortgage producers with the purchasers of these mortgages. The brokers and banks “did not have any skin in the game.”

Description: This essay argues against the securitization of residential mortgages. The originating lending institution should have significant skin in the game when it makes a loan, but the securitization process removes this important financial control.